What changed in NVIDIA's 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 25, 2026

No corresponding language in the FY2025 10-K.

No corresponding language in the FY2025 10-K.

No corresponding language in the FY2025 10-K.

No corresponding language in the FY2025 10-K.

No corresponding language in the FY2025 10-K.

No corresponding language in the FY2025 10-K.

No corresponding language in the FY2025 10-K.

No corresponding language in the FY2025 10-K.

[removed] We have experienced periods where we receive a significant amount of our revenue from a limited number of customers, and this trend may continue. Sales to direct Customers A, B and C represented 12%, 11% and 11% of total revenue, respectively, for fiscal year 2025, all of which were primarily attributable to the Compute & Networking segment. With several of these partners, we are selling multiple products and systems in our portfolio through their channels. Our operating results depend on sales to our partner network, as well as the ability of these partners to sell products that incorporate our technologies. We have a small number of partners that are involved in system integration with our key customers. As our system design becomes increasingly complex, system integrators may be unable to meet specifications of our key customers. Changes in our partners' or customers' business models or their ownership can reduce the number of partners available to us and harm our ability to sell our advanced data center systems to customers. In the future, these partners may decide to purchase fewer products, not to incorporate our products into their ecosystem, or to alter their purchasing patterns in some other way. Because most of our sales are made on a purchase order basis, our customers can generally cancel, change, or delay product purchase commitments with little notice to us and without penalty. Our partners or customers may develop their own solutions; our customers may purchase products from our competitors; and our partners may discontinue sales or lose market share in the markets for which they purchase our products, all of which may alter partners' or customers' purchasing patterns. Many of our indirect customers often do not purchase directly from us but through multiple OEMs, ODMs, system integrators, distributors, and other channel partners. For fiscal year 2025, an indirect customer which primarily purchases our products through system integrators and distributors, including through Customer B, is estimated to represent 10% or more of total revenue, attributable to the Compute & Networking segment.

[removed] The AI Diffusion IFR would divide the world into three tiers, relegating most countries to "Tier 2" status. The AI Diffusion IFR would confer special benefits on select "Universal Verified End Users", or UVEU, and lesser benefits on "National Verified End Users", or NVEU. The AI Diffusion IFR would have numerous effects that may negatively impact our long-term financial results and competitive position, including but not limited to the following.

[removed] Our competitive position has been harmed by the existing export controls, and our competitive position and future results may be further harmed, over the long term, if there are further changes in the USG's export controls. Given the increasing strategic importance of AI and rising geopolitical tensions, the USG has changed and may again change the export control rules at any time and further subject a wider range of our products to export restrictions and licensing requirements, negatively impacting our business and financial results. In the event of such change, we may be unable to sell our inventory of such products and may be unable to develop replacement products not subject to the licensing requirements, effectively excluding us from all or part of the China market, as well as other impacted markets, including the Middle East and countries designated "Tier 2" by the AI Diffusion IFR. In addition to export controls, the USG may impose restrictions on the import and sale of products that incorporate technologies developed or manufactured in whole or in part in China. For example, the USG is considering restrictions on the import and sale of certain automotive products in the United States, which if adopted and interpreted broadly, could impact our ability to develop and supply solutions for our automotive customers.

[removed] In October 2023, the USG announced new and updated licensing requirements that became effective in our fourth quarter of fiscal year 2024 for exports to China and Country Groups D1, D4, and D5 (including but not limited to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam, but excluding Israel) of our products exceeding certain performance thresholds, including, but not limited to, the A100, A800, H100, H800, L4, L40, L40S and RTX 4090. The licensing requirements also apply to the export of products exceeding certain performance thresholds to a party headquartered in, or with an ultimate parent headquartered in, Country Group D5, including China. On October 23, 2023, the USG informed us that the licensing requirements were effective immediately for shipments of our A100, A800, H100, H800, and L40S products (removing the grace period granted by the official rule). Blackwell systems, such as GB200 NVL 72 and NVL 36 as well as B200 are also subject to these requirements and therefore require a license for any shipment to certain entities and to China and Country Groups D1, D4 and D5, excluding Israel. To date, we have not received licenses to ship these restricted products to China. Additionally, we understand that partners and customers have also not received a license to ship these restricted products.

[removed] We expanded our Data Center product portfolio to offer new solutions, including those for which the USG does not require a license or advance notice before each shipment. We ramped new products designed specifically for China that do not require an export control license. Our Data Center revenue in China grew in fiscal year 2025. As a percentage of total Data Center revenue, it remains well below levels seen prior to the onset of export controls in October 2023. The market in China for datacenter solutions remains competitive. We will continue to comply with export controls while serving our customers. To the extent that a customer requires products covered by the licensing requirements, we may seek a license for the customer but have no assurance that the USG will grant such a license, or that the USG will act on the license application in a timely manner or at all.

[removed] Following these 2022 export controls, we transitioned some operations, including certain testing, validation, and supply and distribution operations out of China and Hong Kong. Any future transitions could be costly and time consuming, and adversely affect our research and development and supply and distribution operations, as well as our revenue, during any such transition period. We expanded our Data Center product portfolio to offer new solutions, including those for which the USG does not require a license or advance notice before each shipment. To the extent that a customer requires products covered by the licensing requirements, we may seek a license for the customer. However, the licensing process is time-consuming. We have no assurance that the USG will grant such a license or that the USG will act on the license application in a timely manner or at all. Even if a license is approved, it may impose burdensome conditions that we or our customer or end users cannot or decide not to accept. The USG evaluates license requests in a closed process that does not have clear standards or an opportunity for review. For example, the Notified Advanced Computing, or "NAC," process has not resulted in approvals for exports of products to customers in China. The license process for exports to D1 and D4 countries has been time-consuming and resulted in license conditions that are onerous, even for small-sized systems that are not able to [removed] train frontier AI models. The requirements have a disproportionate impact on NVIDIA and already have disadvantaged and may in the future disadvantage NVIDIA against certain of our competitors [removed] who sell products that are not subject to the new restrictions or may be able to acquire licenses for their products.

Additionally, restrictions imposed by the Chinese government on the duration of gaming activities and access to games may adversely affect our Gaming revenue, and increased oversight of digital platform companies may adversely affect our Data Center revenue. The Chinese government [removed] may also encourage customers to purchase from our China-based [removed] competitors, or impose restrictions on the sale to certain customers of our products, or any products containing components made by our partners and suppliers. For example, the Chinese government announced restrictions relating to certain sales of products containing certain products made by Micron, a supplier of ours. As another example, an agency of the Chinese government announced an Action Plan that endorses new standards regarding the compute performance per watt and per memory bandwidth of accelerators used in new and renovated data centers in China. [removed] If the Chinese government [removed] modifies or implements the Action Plan in a way that effectively prevents us from being able to design products to meet the new standard, [removed] this may restrict the ability of customers to use some of our data center products and may have a material and adverse impact on our business, operating results and financial condition. Further restrictions on our products or the products of our suppliers could negatively impact our business and financial results.

Increasing use of economic sanctions and export controls has impacted and may in the future impact demand for our products or services, negatively impacting our business and financial results. Reduced demand due to export controls [removed] could also lead to excess inventory or cause us to incur related supply charges. Additional unilateral or multilateral controls are also likely to include deemed export control limitations that negatively impact the ability of our research and development teams to execute our roadmap or other objectives in a timely manner. Additional export restrictions may not only impact our ability to serve overseas markets, but also provoke responses from foreign governments, including China, that negatively impact our supply chain or our ability to provide our products and services to customers in all markets worldwide, which could also substantially reduce our revenue. Regulators in China have inquired about our sales and efforts to supply the China market and our fulfillment of the commitments we entered at the close of our Mellanox acquisition. [removed] For example, regulators in China are investigating whether complying with applicable U.S. export controls discriminates unfairly against customers in the China market. If regulators conclude that we have failed to fulfill such commitments or we have violated any applicable law in China, we could be subject to financial penalties, restrictions on our ability to conduct our business, restrictions regarding our networking products and services, or otherwise impact our operations in China, any of which could have a material and adverse impact on our business, operating results and financial condition.

Our competitive position has been harmed by [removed] the existing export controls, and our competitive position and future results [removed] may be further harmed, over the long term, if [removed] there are further changes in the USG's export controls, including further expansion of the geographic, customer, or product [removed] scope of the controls, if customers purchase product from competitors, if customers develop their own internal solution, if we are unable to provide contractual warranty or other extended service obligations, if the USG does not grant licenses in a timely manner or denies licenses to significant customers or if we incur significant transition costs. Even if the USG grants any requested licenses, the licenses [removed] may be temporary or impose burdensome conditions that we or our customers or end users cannot or choose not to fulfill. The licensing requirements [removed] may benefit certain of our competitors, as the licensing process will make our pre-sale and post-sale technical support efforts more cumbersome and less certain and encourage customers in [removed] China to pursue alternatives to our products, including semiconductor suppliers based in China, Europe, and Israel.

Given the increasing strategic importance of AI and rising geopolitical tensions, the USG has changed and may again change the export control rules at any time and further subject a wider range of our products to export restrictions and licensing requirements, negatively impacting our business and financial results. In the event of such change, we may be unable to sell our inventory of such products and may be unable to develop replacement products not subject to the licensing requirements, effectively excluding us from all or part of the China market, as well as other impacted markets, including the Middle East and countries designated "Tier 2" by the AI Diffusion IFR. For example, the USG has already imposed conditions to limit the ability of foreign firms to create and offer as a service large-scale GPU clusters, for example by imposing license conditions on the use of products to be exported to certain countries, and may impose additional conditions such as requiring chip tracking and throttling mechanisms that could disable or impair GPUs if certain events, including unauthorized system configuration, use, or location, are detected. The USG has already imposed export controls restricting certain gaming GPUs, and if the USG expands such controls to restrict additional gaming products, it may disrupt a significant portion of our supply and distribution chain and negatively impact sales of such products to markets outside China, including the U.S. and Europe. In addition, as the performance of the gaming GPUs increases over time, export controls may have a greater impact on our ability to compete in markets subject to those controls. Export controls may disrupt our supply and distribution chain for a substantial portion of our products, which are warehoused in and distributed from Hong Kong. Export controls restricting our ability to sell data center GPUs may also negatively impact demand for our networking products used in servers containing our GPUs. The USG may also impose export controls on our networking products, such as high-speed network interconnects, to limit the ability of downstream parties to create large clusters for frontier model training. Any new control that impacts a wider range of our products would likely have a disproportionate impact on NVIDIA and may disadvantage us against certain of our competitors that sell chips that are outside the scope of such control. Excessive or shifting export controls have already and may in the future encourage customers outside China and other impacted regions to "design-out" certain U.S. semiconductors from their products to reduce the compliance burden and risk, and to ensure that they are able to serve markets worldwide. Excessive or shifting export controls have already encouraged and may in the future encourage overseas governments to request that our customers purchase from our competitors rather than NVIDIA or other U.S. firms, harming our business, market position, and financial results. As a result, excessive or shifting export controls may negatively impact demand for our products and services not only in China, but also in other markets, such as Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Excessive or shifting export controls increase the risk of investing in U.S. advanced semiconductor products, because by the time a new product is ready for market, it may be subject to new unilateral export controls restricting its sale. [removed] At the same time, such controls may increase investment in foreign competitors, which would be less likely to be restricted by U.S. controls. If additional products are subject to [removed] worldwide licensing requirements, we may incur significant inventory provisions and excess purchase obligation charges.

We have experienced periods where we receive a significant amount of our revenue from a limited number of customers, and this trend may continue. Sales to direct Customers A, B and C represented 12%, 11% and 11% of total revenue, respectively, for fiscal year 2025, all of which were primarily attributable to the Compute & Networking segment. With several of these partners, we are selling multiple products and systems in our portfolio through their channels. Our operating results depend on sales to our partner network, as well as the ability of these partners to sell products that incorporate our technologies. We have a small number of partners that are involved in system integration with our key customers. As our system design becomes increasingly complex, system integrators may be unable to meet specifications of our key customers. Changes in our partners' or customers' business models or their ownership can reduce the number of partners available to us and harm our ability to sell our advanced data center systems to customers. In the future, these partners may decide to purchase fewer products, not to incorporate our products into their ecosystem, or to alter their purchasing patterns in some other way. Because most of our sales are made on a purchase order basis, our customers can generally cancel, change, or delay product purchase commitments with little notice to us and without penalty. Our partners or customers may develop their own solutions; our customers may purchase products from our competitors; and our partners may discontinue sales or lose market share in the markets for which they purchase our products, all of which may alter partners' or customers' purchasing patterns.[removed] Many of our indirect customers often do not purchase directly from us but through multiple OEMs, ODMs, system integrators, distributors, and other channel partners. For fiscal year 2025, an indirect customer which primarily purchases our products through system integrators and distributors, including through Customer B, is estimated to represent 10% or more of total revenue, attributable to the Compute & Networking segment. If end demand increases or our finished goods supply availability is concentrated near a quarter end, the system integrators, distributors, and channel partners may have limited ability to increase their credit, which could impact the timing and amount of our revenue. The loss of any of our large customers, a significant reduction in purchases by them, our inability to sell to a customer due to U.S. or other countries' trade restrictions, or any difficulties in collecting accounts receivable would likely harm our financial condition and results of operations.

[removed] The AI Diffusion [removed] IFR's licensing requirement could impact our ability to complete development of products in a timely manner, support existing customers using covered products, or supply customers with covered products outside the impacted regions, and may require us to transition certain operations out of one or more of the identified countries.

Export controls [removed] could disrupt our supply chain and distribution channels, negatively impacting our ability to serve demand, including in markets outside China and for our [removed] gaming products. The possibility of additional export controls has negatively impacted and may in the future negatively impact demand for our products, benefiting competitors that offer alternatives less likely to be restricted by further controls. Repeated changes in the export control rules are likely to impose compliance burdens on our business and our customers, negatively and materially impacting our business.

Undiscovered vulnerabilities in our products or services could result in loss of data or intangible property, or expose our customers to unscrupulous third parties who develop and deploy malicious software programs that could attack our products or services. Defects or failure of our offerings to perform to specifications could lead to substantial damage to the products in which our offerings have been integrated by OEMs, ODMs, AIB manufacturers, automotive manufacturers, and tier 1 automotive suppliers, and to the user of such end product. [removed] Any such defect may cause us to incur significant warranty, support, and repair or replacement costs as part of a product recall or otherwise, write-off the value of related inventory, and divert the attention of our engineering and management personnel from our product development efforts to find and correct the issue. Our efforts to remedy these issues may not be timely or satisfactory to our customers. An error or defect in new products, releases or related software drivers after commencement of commercial shipments could result in failure to achieve market acceptance, loss of design wins, temporary or permanent withdrawal from a product or market and harm to our relationships with existing and prospective customers and partners and consumers' perceptions of our brand, which would in turn negatively impact our business operations, gross margin, revenue and/or financial results. We may be required to reimburse our customers, partners or consumers, including for costs to repair or replace products in the field or in connection with indemnification obligations, or pay fines imposed by regulatory agencies.

In addition to export controls, the USG may impose restrictions on the import and sale of products that incorporate technologies developed or manufactured in whole or in part in China. For example, the USG [removed] is considering restrictions on the import and sale of certain automotive products in the United States, which if adopted and interpreted broadly, could impact our ability to develop and supply solutions for our automotive customers.

• our customers' ability to [removed] invest in AI infrastructure.

[removed] On October 23, 2023, the USG informed us [removed] that the licensing requirements were effective immediately for shipments of our A100, A800, H100, H800, and L40S products (removing the grace period granted by the official rule). Blackwell systems, such as GB200 NVL 72 and NVL 36 as well as B200 are also subject to these requirements and therefore require a license for any shipment to certain entities and to China and Country Groups D1, D4, and D5, excluding Israel. To date, we have not received licenses to ship these restricted products to China.

[removed] For example, in fiscal year 2023, a defect was identified in a third-party component embedded in certain Data Center products. This defect has had, and other defects may in the future have, an adverse effect on our cost and supply of components and finished goods. These costs could be significant in future periods. We recorded a net warranty liability during fiscal year 2023 primarily in connection with this defect. While we believe we have accurately recorded for warranty obligations, we may need to record additional amounts in the future if our estimate proves to be incorrect. In general, if a product liability claim regarding any of our products is brought against us, even if the alleged damage is due to the actions or inactions of a third party, such as within our supply chain, the cost of defending the claim could be significant and would divert the efforts of our technical and management personnel and harm our business. Further, our business liability insurance may be inadequate or future coverage may be unavailable on acceptable terms, which could adversely impact our financial results.

[removed] On January 15, 2025, the USG published the [removed] "AI Diffusion" IFR in the Federal Register. [removed] After a 120-day delayed compliance period, the IFR will, unless modified, impose a worldwide licensing requirement on [removed] all products classified under Export Control Classification Numbers, or ECCNs, 3A090.a, 4A090.a, or corresponding .z ECCNs, including all related software and technology. Any system that incorporates one or more of the covered integrated circuits, or ICs, (including but not limited to NVIDIA DGX, HGX, and MGX systems) will be covered by the new licensing requirement. The licensing requirement will include future NVIDIA ICs, boards, or systems classified with ECCN 3A090.a or 4A090.a, or corresponding .z ECCNs, achieving certain total processing performance and/or performance density.

We acquire and invest in businesses that offer products, services and technologies that we believe will help expand or enhance our strategic objectives. Acquisitions or investments involve significant challenges and risks and could impair our ability to grow our business, develop new products or sell our products and ultimately could have a negative impact on our financial results. If we pursue a particular transaction, we may limit our ability to enter into other transactions that could help us achieve our other strategic objectives. If we are unable to timely complete acquisitions, including due to delays and challenges in obtaining regulatory approvals, we may be unable to pursue other transactions, we may not be able to retain critical talent from the target company, technology may evolve and make the acquisition less attractive, and other changes can take place, which could reduce the anticipated benefits of the transaction and negatively impact our business. Regulators could also impose conditions that reduce the ultimate value of our acquisitions. In addition, to the extent that our perceived ability to consummate acquisitions has been harmed, future acquisitions may be more difficult, complex or expensive. Further, our investments in publicly traded companies could create volatility in our results and may generate losses up to the value of the investment. In addition, we have invested and may continue to invest in private companies to further our strategic objectives and to support certain key business initiatives. These companies can include early-stage companies still defining their strategic direction. [removed] Many of the instruments in which we invest are non-marketable and illiquid at the time of our initial investment, and we are not always able to achieve a return. To the extent any of the companies in which we invest are not successful, we could recognize an impairment and/or lose all or part of our investment. Our investment portfolio contains industry sector concentration risks, and a decline in any one or multiple industry sectors could increase our impairment losses.

In the ordinary course of business, we transfer personal data from Europe, China, and other jurisdictions to the United States or other countries. Certain jurisdictions have enacted data localization laws and cross-border personal data transfer laws. For example, the GDPR governs the transfer of personal data to countries outside of the EEA. The European Commission released a set of "Standard Contractual Clauses" designed for entities to validly transfer personal data out of the EEA to jurisdictions that the European Commission has not found to provide an adequate level of protection, including the United States. Additionally, the U.K.'s International Data Transfer Agreement / Addendum, as well as the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework and the U.K. extension thereto (which allows for transfers to relevant U.S.-based organizations who self-certify compliance and participate in the Framework) are mechanisms that may be used to transfer personal data from the EEA and U.K. to the United States. However, these mechanisms are subject to legal challenges, and there is no assurance that we can satisfy or rely on these measures to lawfully transfer personal data to the United States. Other jurisdictions have enacted or are considering similar cross-border personal data transfer laws and local personal data residency laws, any of which would increase the cost and complexity of doing business and could result in fines from regulators. For example, China's law imposes various requirements relating to data processing and data localization. Data broadly defined as important under China's law, including personal data, may not be transferable outside of China without prior assessment and approval by the Cyberspace Administration of China, or CAC. Compliance with these requirements, including CAC assessments and any deemed failures of such assessments, could cause us to incur liability, prevent us from using data collected in China or impact our ability to transfer data outside of China. The inability to import personal data to the United States could significantly and negatively impact our business operations, limit our ability to collaborate with parties that are subject to European, China and other data privacy and security laws, or require us to increase our personal data processing capabilities in Europe and/or elsewhere at significant expense. Some European regulators have prevented companies from transferring personal data out of Europe for allegedly violating the GDPR's cross-border data transfer limitations, which could negatively impact our business.

Our target markets remain competitive, and competition may intensify with expanding and changing product and service offerings, industry standards, customer and market needs, new entrants and consolidations. Our competitors' products, services and technologies, including those mentioned above in this Annual Report on Form 10-K, may be cheaper or provide better functionality or features than ours, which has resulted and may in the future result in lower-than-expected selling prices or demand for our products. Some of our competitors operate their own fabrication facilities, and have longer operating histories, larger customer bases, more comprehensive IP portfolios and patent protections, more design [removed] wins, and greater financial, sales, marketing and distribution resources than we do. These competitors may be able to acquire market share and/or prevent us from doing so, more effectively identify and capitalize upon opportunities in new markets and end-user trends, more quickly transition their products, and impinge on our ability to procure sufficient foundry capacity and scarce input materials during a supply-constrained environment, which could harm our business. Some of our customers have in-house expertise and internal development capabilities similar to some of ours and can use or develop their own solutions to replace those we are providing. For example, others may offer cloud-based services that compete with our AI cloud service offerings, and we may not be able to establish market share sufficient to achieve the scale necessary to meet our business objectives. If we are unable to successfully compete in this environment, demand for our products, services and technologies could [removed] decrease and we may not establish meaningful revenue.

Factors that have caused and/or could in the future cause disruptions to our worldwide operations include: natural disasters, extreme weather conditions, power or water shortages, critical infrastructure failures, telecommunications failures, supplier disruptions, terrorist attacks, acts of violence, political and/or civil unrest, acts of war or other military actions, epidemics or pandemics, abrupt regulatory changes, and other natural or man-made disasters and catastrophic events. Our corporate headquarters, a large portion of our current data center capacity, and a portion of our research and development activities are located in California, and other critical business operations, finished goods inventory and some of our suppliers are located in Asia, making our operations vulnerable to natural disasters such as earthquakes, wildfires or other business disruptions occurring in these geographical areas. Catastrophic events can also have an impact on third-party vendors who provide us critical infrastructure services for IT and research and development systems and personnel. Geopolitical and domestic political developments and other events beyond our control can increase economic volatility globally. Political instability, changes in government or adverse political developments in or around any of the major countries in which we do business may harm our business, financial condition and results of operations. Worldwide geopolitical tensions and conflicts, including but not limited to China, Hong Kong, Israel, Korea and Taiwan where the manufacture of our product components and final assembly of our products are concentrated may result in changing regulatory requirements, and other disruptions that could impact our operations and operating strategies, product [removed] demand, access to global markets, hiring, and profitability. For example, other countries have restricted and may continue in the future to restrict business with the State of Israel, where we have engineering, sales support operations and manufacturing, and companies with Israeli operations, including by economic boycotts. Our operations could be harmed and our costs could increase if manufacturing, logistics, or other operations are disrupted for any reason, including natural disasters, high heat events, water shortages, power shortages, information technology system failures or cyber-attacks, military actions or economic, and business, labor, environmental, public health, or political issues. The ultimate impact on us, our third-party foundries and other suppliers of being located and consolidated in certain geographical areas is unknown. In the event a disaster, war, or catastrophic event affects us, the third-party systems on which we rely, or our customers, our business could be harmed as a result of declines in revenue, increases in expenses, and substantial expenditures and time spent to fully resume operations. Our business continuity and disaster recovery planning may not be sufficient for all eventualities. All of these risks and conditions could materially adversely affect our future sales and operating results.

We have experienced periods where we receive a significant amount of our revenue from a limited number of customers, and this trend may continue. Sales to direct Customers A, B and C represented 12%, 11% and 11% of total revenue, respectively, for fiscal year 2025, all of which were primarily attributable to the Compute & Networking segment. With several of these partners, we are selling multiple products and systems in our portfolio through their channels. Our operating results depend on sales to our partner network, as well as the ability of these partners to sell products that incorporate our technologies. We have a small number of partners that are involved in system integration with our key customers. As our system design becomes increasingly complex, system integrators may be unable to meet specifications of our key customers. Changes in our partners' or customers' business models or their ownership can reduce the number of partners available to us and harm our ability to sell our advanced data center systems to customers. In the future, these partners may decide to purchase fewer products, not to incorporate our products into their ecosystem, or to alter their purchasing patterns in some other way. Because most of our sales are made on a purchase order basis, our customers can generally cancel, change, or delay product purchase commitments with little notice to us and without penalty. Our partners or customers may develop their own solutions; our customers may purchase products from our competitors; and our partners may discontinue sales or lose market share in the markets for which they purchase our products, all of which may alter partners' or customers' purchasing patterns. Many of our indirect customers often do not purchase directly from us but through multiple OEMs, ODMs, system integrators, distributors, and other channel partners. For fiscal year 2025, an indirect customer which primarily purchases our products through system integrators and distributors, including through Customer B, is estimated to represent 10% or more of total revenue, attributable to the Compute & Networking segment. If end demand increases or our finished goods supply availability is concentrated near a quarter end, the system integrators, distributors, and channel partners may have limited ability to increase their credit, which could impact the timing and amount of our revenue. The loss of any of our large customers, a significant reduction in purchases by them, our inability to sell to a customer due to U.S. or other countries' trade restrictions, or any difficulties in collecting accounts receivable would likely harm our financial condition and results of operations.

• lack of guaranteed supply of [removed] wafer, component and capacity;

Given the increasing strategic importance of AI and rising geopolitical tensions, the USG has changed and may again change the export control rules at any time and further subject a wider range of our products to export restrictions and licensing requirements, negatively impacting our business and financial results. In the event of such change, we may be unable to sell our inventory of such products and may be unable to develop replacement products not subject to the licensing [removed] requirements, effectively excluding us from all or part of the China market, as well as other impacted markets, including the Middle East and countries designated "Tier 2" by the AI Diffusion IFR. For example, the USG has already imposed conditions to limit the ability of foreign firms to create and offer as a service large-scale GPU clusters, for example by imposing license conditions on the use of products to be exported to certain countries, and may impose additional conditions such as requiring chip tracking and throttling mechanisms that could disable or impair GPUs if certain events, including unauthorized system configuration, use, or location, are detected. The USG has already imposed export controls restricting certain gaming GPUs, and if the USG expands such controls to restrict additional gaming products, it may disrupt a significant portion of our supply and distribution chain and negatively impact sales of such products to markets outside China, including the U.S. and Europe. In addition, as the performance of the gaming GPUs increases over time, export controls may have a greater impact on our ability to compete in markets subject to those controls. Export controls may disrupt our supply and distribution chain for a substantial portion of our products, which are warehoused in and distributed from Hong Kong. Export controls restricting our ability to sell data center GPUs may also negatively impact demand for our networking products used in servers containing our GPUs. The USG may also impose export controls on our networking products, such as high-speed network interconnects, to limit the ability of downstream parties to create large clusters for frontier model training. Any new control that impacts a wider range of our products would likely have a disproportionate impact on NVIDIA and may disadvantage us against certain of our competitors that sell chips that are outside the scope of such control. Excessive or shifting export controls have already and may in the future encourage customers outside China and other impacted regions to "design-out" certain U.S. semiconductors from their products to reduce the compliance burden and risk, and to ensure that they are able to serve markets worldwide. Excessive or shifting export controls have already encouraged and may in the future encourage overseas governments to request that our customers purchase from our competitors rather than NVIDIA or other U.S. firms, harming our business, market position, and financial results. As a result, excessive or shifting export controls may negatively impact demand for our products and services not only in China, but also in other markets, such as Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Excessive or shifting export controls increase the risk of investing in U.S. advanced semiconductor products, because by the time a new product is ready for market, it may be subject to new unilateral export controls restricting its sale. At the same time, such controls may increase investment in foreign competitors, which would be less likely to be restricted by U.S. controls. If additional products are subject to worldwide licensing requirements, we may incur significant inventory provisions and excess purchase obligation charges.

We continue to increase our supply and capacity purchases with existing and new suppliers to support our demand projections and increasing complexity of our data center products. [removed] With these additions, we have also entered and may continue to enter into prepaid manufacturing and capacity agreements to supply both current and future products. The increased purchase volumes and integration of new suppliers and contract manufacturers into our supply chain creates more complexity in managing multiple suppliers with variations in production planning, execution and logistics. Our expanding product portfolio and varying component compatibility and quality may lead to increased inventory levels. We have incurred and may in the future incur inventory provisions or impairments if our inventory or supply or capacity commitments exceed demand for our products or demand declines.

We [removed] offer enterprise customers NVIDIA DGX Cloud services, which include cloud-based infrastructure, software and services for training and deploying AI models. We have partnered with CSPs to host such software and services in their data centers, and we entered and may continue to enter into multi-year cloud service agreements to support [removed] these offerings and our research and development activities. The timing and availability of these cloud services have changed and may continue to shift, impacting our revenue, expenses, and development [removed] timelines. NVIDIA DGX Cloud services may not [removed] be successful and will take time, resources, and investment. We also offer or plan to offer standalone software solutions, including NVIDIA AI Enterprise, NVIDIA Omniverse, NVIDIA DRIVE, and other software products. These [removed] new business models or strategies may not be successful, and we may fail to sell any meaningful standalone software or services. We may incur significant costs and may not achieve any significant revenue from these offerings.

We are subject to laws and regulations domestically and worldwide, affecting our operations in areas including, but not limited to, IP ownership and infringement; taxes; import and export requirements and tariffs; anti-corruption, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; business acquisitions; foreign exchange controls and cash repatriation restrictions; foreign ownership and investment; data privacy requirements; competition and antitrust; advertising; employment; product regulations; cybersecurity; environmental, health, and safety requirements; the responsible use of AI; sustainability; cryptocurrency; and consumer laws. Compliance with such requirements can be onerous and expensive, could impact our competitive position, and may negatively impact our business operations and ability to manufacture and ship our products. There can be no assurance that our employees, contractors, suppliers, customers or agents will not violate applicable laws or the policies, controls, and procedures that we have designed to help ensure compliance with such laws, and violations could result in fines, criminal sanctions against us, our officers, or our employees, prohibitions on the conduct of our business, and damage to our reputation. Changes to the laws, rules and regulations to which we are subject, or changes to their interpretation and enforcement, could lead to materially greater compliance and other costs, and/or further restrictions on our ability to manufacture and supply our products and operate our business. For example, we may face increased compliance costs as a result of changes or increases in antitrust legislation, regulation, administrative rule making, increased focus from regulators on cybersecurity vulnerabilities and risks. Our position in markets relating to AI has led to increased interest in our business from regulators worldwide, including the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, South [removed] Korea and China. For example, the French Competition Authority collected information from us regarding our business and competition in the graphics card and [removed] cloud service provider market as part of an ongoing inquiry into competition in those markets. We have also received, and continue to receive, broad requests for information from competition regulators in the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and South Korea regarding our sales of GPUs and other NVIDIA products, our efforts to allocate supply, foundation models and our investments, partnerships and other agreements with companies developing foundation models, the markets in which we compete and our competition, our strategies, roadmaps, and efforts to develop, market, and sell hardware, software, and system solutions, and our agreements with customers, suppliers, and partners. We expect to receive additional requests for information in the future. Such requests [removed] may be expensive and burdensome and could negatively impact our business and our relationships with customers, suppliers, and partners.

• develop or [removed] acquire new products and technologies through investments in research and development;

Challenges in estimating demand could become more pronounced or volatile in the future on both a global and regional basis. Extended lead times may occur if we experience other supply constraints caused by natural disasters, pandemics or other events. [removed] In addition, geopolitical tensions, such as those involving Taiwan and China, which comprise a significant portion of our revenue and where we [removed] have suppliers, contract manufacturers, and assembly partners [removed] who are critical to our supply continuity, could have a material adverse impact on us.

[removed] During the third quarter of fiscal year 2023, the USG announced export restrictions and export licensing requirements targeting China's semiconductor and supercomputing industries. These restrictions [removed] impact exports of certain chips, as well as software, hardware, equipment and technology used to develop, produce and manufacture certain chips to China (including Hong Kong and Macau) and Russia, and specifically impact our A100 and H100 integrated circuits, DGX or any other systems or boards which incorporate A100 or H100 integrated circuits.[removed] The licensing requirements also apply to any future NVIDIA integrated circuit achieving certain peak performance and chip-to-chip I/O performance thresholds, as well as any system or board that includes those circuits. There are also now licensing requirements to export a wide array of products, including networking products, destined for certain end users and for certain end uses in China. During the second quarter of fiscal year 2024, the USG also informed us of an additional licensing requirement for a subset of A100 and H100 products destined to certain customers and other regions, including some countries in the Middle East.

Demand estimates for our products, applications, and services can be incorrect, which may create volatility in our revenue or supply levels. We may not be able to generate significant revenue from them. Because our products may be used in multiple use cases and applications, it is difficult to estimate with any reasonable degree of precision the impact of [removed] generative AI models on our reported revenue or forecasted demand.

Further, changes in tax laws or their interpretation by tax authorities in the U.S. or foreign jurisdictions could increase our future tax liability or cause other adverse tax impacts, which may materially impact our results of operations, or the way we conduct our business. Most of our income is taxable in the U.S., with a significant portion qualifying for preferential treatment as foreign-derived [removed] intangible income, or [removed] FDII. If U.S. tax rates increase or the [removed] FDII deduction is reduced, our provision for income taxes, results of operations, net income, and cash flows would be adversely affected. In addition, our tax obligations and effective tax rate in the jurisdictions in which we conduct business could increase as a result of international tax developments, including the implementation of the Two-Pillar framework led by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, or OECD, which involves the reallocation of taxing rights in respect of certain multinational enterprises above a fixed profit margin to the jurisdictions in which they carry on business (referred to as Pillar One), and imposes a minimum effective corporate tax rate (referred to as Pillar Two). A number of countries in which we conduct business have enacted, or are in the process of enacting, elements of the Pillar Two [removed] rules. Any such tax laws, or changes in any such tax [removed] laws may increase tax uncertainty and compliance costs and adversely affect our provision for income taxes, cash tax payments, results of operations, and financial condition.

Our business and those of our suppliers and customers [removed] may also be subject to [removed] climate-related laws, regulations and lawsuits. New or proposed regulations relating to carbon taxes, fuel or energy taxes, pollution limits, sustainability-related disclosure and governance and supply chain governance could result in greater direct costs, including costs associated with changes to manufacturing processes or the procurement of raw materials used in manufacturing processes, increased capital expenditures to improve facilities and equipment, higher compliance and energy costs to reduce emissions, other compliance costs, and greater indirect costs resulting from our customers and/or suppliers incurring additional compliance costs that are passed on to us. These costs and restrictions could harm our business and results of operations by increasing our expenses or requiring us to alter our operations and product design activities.

Individuals, groups of hackers and sophisticated organizations, including nation-states and nation-state-supported actors, and other threat actors have engaged and are expected to continue to engage in cyber-attacks. Additionally, some actors are using AI technology to launch more automated, targeted and coordinated attacks. Due to geopolitical conflicts and during times of war or other major conflicts, we and the third parties we rely upon may be subject to a heightened risk of cyber-attacks that could materially disrupt our ability to provide services and products. We may also face cybersecurity threats due to error or intentional misconduct by employees, contractors or other third-party service providers. Certain aspects of effective cybersecurity are dependent upon our employees, contractors and/or other third-party service providers safeguarding our sensitive information and adhering to our security policies and access control mechanisms. We have in the past experienced, and may in the future experience, security incidents arising from a failure to properly handle sensitive information or adhere to our security policies and access control mechanisms, including, for example, employees posting company data on third-party websites without permission, and, although no such events have had a material adverse effect on our business, there can be no assurance that an insider threat or error will not result in an incident that is material to us or lead to negative publicity. Furthermore, we rely on products and services provided by third-party suppliers to operate certain critical business systems, including without limitation, cloud-based infrastructure, encryption and authentication technology, employee email and other functions, which exposes us to [removed] supply-chain attacks or other business disruptions. We cannot guarantee that third parties and infrastructure in our supply chain or our partners' supply chains have not been compromised or that they do not contain exploitable vulnerabilities, defects or bugs that could result in a breach of or disruption to our information technology systems, including our products and services, or the third-party information technology systems that support our services. We have incorporated third-party data into some of our AI models and used open-source datasets to train our models and may continue to do so. These datasets may be flawed, insufficient, or contain certain biased information, and may otherwise decrease resilience to security incidents that may compromise the integrity of our AI outputs, leading to potential reputational damage, regulatory scrutiny, or adverse impacts on the performance and reliability of our products, which could, in turn, affect our partners' operations, customer trust, and our revenue. We may have limited insight into the data privacy or security practices of third-party suppliers, including for our AI algorithms. Our ability to monitor these third parties' information security practices is limited, and they may not have adequate information security measures in place. In addition, if one of our third-party suppliers suffers a security incident (which has happened in the past and may happen in the future), our response may be limited or more difficult because we may not have direct access to their systems, logs and other information related to the security incident. Additionally, we are incorporated into the supply chain of a large number of entities worldwide and, as a result, if our products or services are compromised, a significant number of our customers and their data could be affected, which could result in potential liability and harm our business.

Additionally, we maintain [removed] an investment portfolio of various holdings, types, and maturities. These investments are subject to general credit, liquidity, market and interest rate risks, which may be exacerbated by market downturns or events that affect global financial markets, as described above. A majority of our investment portfolio comprises USG securities. A decline in global financial markets for long periods or a downgrade of the USG credit rating due to an actual or threatened default on government debt could result in higher interest rates, a decline in the value of the U.S. dollar, reduced market liquidity or other adverse conditions. These factors could cause an unrealized or realized loss position in our investments or require us to record impairment charges.

We acquire and invest in businesses that offer products, services and technologies that we believe will help expand or enhance our strategic objectives. Acquisitions or investments involve significant challenges and risks and could impair our ability to grow our business, develop new products or sell our products and ultimately could have a negative impact on our financial results. If we pursue a particular transaction, we may limit our ability to enter into other transactions that could help us achieve our other strategic objectives. If we are unable to timely complete acquisitions, including due to delays and challenges in obtaining regulatory approvals, we may be unable to pursue other transactions, we may not be able to retain critical talent from the target company, technology may evolve and make the acquisition less attractive, and other changes can take place, which could reduce the anticipated benefits of the transaction and negatively impact our business. Regulators could also impose conditions that reduce the ultimate value of our acquisitions. In addition, to the extent that our perceived ability to consummate acquisitions [removed] has been harmed, future acquisitions may be more difficult, complex or expensive.[removed] Further, our investments in publicly traded companies could create volatility in our results and may generate losses up to the value of the investment. In addition, we have invested and may continue to invest in private companies to further our strategic objectives and to support certain key business initiatives. These companies can include early-stage companies still defining their strategic direction. Many of the instruments in which we invest are non-marketable and illiquid at the time of our initial investment, and we are not always able to achieve a return. To the extent any of the companies in which we invest are not successful, we could recognize an impairment and/or lose all or part of our investment. Our investment portfolio contains industry sector concentration risks, and a decline in any one or multiple industry sectors could increase our impairment losses.

• Long manufacturing lead times and uncertain supply and [removed] component availability, combined with a failure to estimate customer demand accurately has led and could lead to mismatches between supply and demand.

In October 2023, the USG announced new and updated licensing requirements [removed] that became effective in our fourth quarter of fiscal year 2024 for exports to China and Country Groups [removed] D1, D4, and D5 (including but not limited to, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam, but excluding Israel) of our products exceeding certain performance thresholds, including, but not limited to, the A100, A800, H100, H800, L4, L40, L40S [removed] and RTX 4090. The licensing requirements also apply to the export of products exceeding certain performance thresholds to a party headquartered in, or with an ultimate parent headquartered in, Country Group D5, including China.

Our target markets remain competitive, and competition may intensify with expanding and changing product and service offerings, industry standards, customer and market needs, new entrants and consolidations. Our competitors' products, services and technologies, including those mentioned above in this Annual Report on Form 10-K, may be cheaper or provide better functionality or features than ours, which has resulted and may in the future result in lower-than-expected selling prices or demand for our products. Some of our competitors operate their own fabrication facilities, and have longer operating histories, larger customer bases, more comprehensive IP portfolios and patent protections, more design wins, and greater financial, sales, marketing and distribution resources than we do. These competitors may be able to acquire market share and/or prevent us from doing so, more effectively identify and capitalize upon opportunities in new markets and end-user trends, more quickly transition their products, and impinge on our ability to procure sufficient foundry capacity and scarce input materials during a supply-constrained environment, which could harm our business. Some of our customers have in-house expertise and internal development capabilities similar to some of ours and can use or develop their own solutions to replace those we are providing. For example, others may offer cloud-based services that compete with our AI cloud service offerings, and we may not be able to establish market share sufficient to achieve the scale necessary to meet our business objectives. If we are unable to successfully compete in this environment, demand for our products, services and technologies could decrease and we may not establish meaningful revenue.

Such restrictions could include additional unilateral or multilateral export controls on certain products or technology, including but not limited to AI technologies. As geopolitical tensions have increased, semiconductors associated with AI, including GPUs and related products, are increasingly the focus of export control restrictions proposed by stakeholders in the U.S. and its allies. The United States has imposed unilateral worldwide controls restricting GPUs and associated products, and it is likely that additional unilateral or multilateral controls will be adopted. Such controls have been and may again be very broad in scope and application, prohibit us from exporting our products to any or all customers in one or more markets, [removed] including but not limited to China and over 150 countries designated "Tier 2" by the January 2025 AI Diffusion IFR, and could negatively impact our manufacturing, testing and warehousing locations and options, or could impose other conditions that limit our ability to serve demand abroad and could negatively and materially impact our business, revenue and financial results. Export controls targeting GPUs and semiconductors associated with AI, which have been imposed and are [removed] increasingly likely to be [removed] further tightened, would further [removed] restrict our ability to export our technology, products, or [removed] services even though competitors may not be subject to similar restrictions, creating a competitive disadvantage for us and negatively impacting our business[removed] and financial results. Export controls targeting GPUs and semiconductors associated with AI have subjected and may in the future subject downstream users of our products to additional restrictions on the use, resale, repair, or transfer of our products, negatively impacting our business and financial results. Controls could negatively impact our cost and/or ability to provide services such as NVIDIA AI cloud services and could impact the cost and/or ability for our CSPs and customers to provide services to their end customers, even outside China.

We are monitoring the impact of the geopolitical conflict in and around Israel on our operations, including the health and safety of our approximately [removed] 4,700 employees in the region who primarily support the research and development, operations, and sales and marketing of our networking products. [removed] Some of our employees in the region have been on active military duty for an extended [removed] period and may continue to be absent, which may cause disruption to our product development or operations. We have not experienced significant impact or expense to our business; however, if the conflict is further extended or expanded, it could impact future product development, operations, and revenue or create other uncertainty for our business.

Governments and regulators are also considering, and in certain cases, have imposed restrictions on the hardware, software, and systems used to develop frontier foundation models and generative AI. For example, the EU AI Act became effective on August 1, 2024 and will be fully applicable after a two-year transitional period. The EU AI Act may impact our ability to train, deploy, or release AI models in the EU. Several states are considering enacting or have already enacted regulations concerning AI technologies, which may impact our ability to train, deploy, or release AI models, and increase our compliance costs. Restrictions under these and any other regulations, if implemented, could increase the costs and burdens to us and our customers, delay or halt deployment of new systems using our products, and reduce the number of new entrants and customers, negatively impacting our business and financial results. Revisions to laws or regulations or their interpretation and enforcement could also result in increased taxation, trade sanctions, the imposition of or increase to import duties or tariffs, restrictions and controls on imports or exports, or other retaliatory actions, which could have an adverse effect on our business plans or impact the timing of our shipments. Additionally, changes in the public perception of governments in the regions where we operate or plan to operate could negatively impact our business and results of operations.

Product transitions are complex and we often ship both new and prior architecture products simultaneously as our channel partners prepare to ship and support new products. We are generally in various stages of transitioning the architectures of our Data Center, Gaming, Professional Visualization, and Automotive products. The computing industry is experiencing a broader and faster launch cadence of accelerated computing platforms to meet a growing and diverse set of AI opportunities. We have introduced a new product and architecture cadence of our Data Center solutions where we seek to complete new computing solutions each year and provide a greater variety of Data Center offerings. The increased frequency of these transitions and the larger number of products and product configurations may magnify the challenges associated with managing our supply and demand which may further create volatility in our revenue. Qualification time for new products, customers anticipating product transitions, and channel partners reducing channel inventory of prior architectures ahead of new product introductions can reduce, or create volatility in, our revenue. We have experienced and may in the future experience reduced demand for current generation architectures when customers anticipate transitions, and we may be unable to sell multiple product architectures at the same time for current and future architecture transitions. Our financial results have been and may in the future be negatively impacted if we are unable to execute our architectural transitions as planned for any reason. The increased frequency and complexity of newly introduced products could result in unanticipated quality or production issues that could increase the magnitude of inventory provisions, warranty, or other costs or result in product delays. For example, our gross margins in the second quarter of fiscal year 2025 were negatively impacted by inventory provisions for low-yielding Blackwell material.

We currently and will likely continue to face legal, administrative and regulatory proceedings, claims, demands and/or investigations involving shareholder, consumer, [removed] competition and/or other issues relating to our business. For example, we are defending a securities class action lawsuit from multiple shareholders asserting claims that we and certain of our officers made false and/or misleading statements related to channel inventory and the impact of cryptocurrency mining on GPU demand in 2017 and 2018. Litigation and regulatory proceedings are inherently uncertain, and adverse rulings could occur, including monetary damages or fines, or an injunction stopping us from manufacturing or selling certain products, engaging in certain business practices, or requiring other remedies, such as compulsory licensing of patents. An unfavorable outcome or settlement may result in a material adverse impact. Regardless of the outcome, litigation can be costly, time-consuming, and disruptive to our operations.

We sell our products internationally, and we also have operations and conduct business internationally. Our semiconductor wafers are manufactured, assembled, tested and packaged by third parties located outside of the United States, and we generated [removed] 53% of our revenue in fiscal year [removed] 2025 from sales outside the United States. The market in China, where our offerings are limited by export controls, is highly competitive and we expect it to remain competitive going forward. The global nature of our business subjects us to a number of risks and uncertainties, which have had in the past and could in the future have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of operations. These include domestic and international economic and political conditions in countries in which we and our suppliers and manufacturers do business, government lockdowns to control case spread of global or local health issues, differing legal standards with respect to protection of IP and employment practices, different domestic and international business and cultural practices, disruptions to capital markets, counter-inflation policies, currency fluctuations, natural disasters, acts of war or other military actions, terrorism, public health issues, restrictions on international trade, such as tariffs, sanctions, and other controls on imports or exports, and catastrophic events.

Individuals, groups of hackers and sophisticated organizations, including nation-states and nation-state-supported actors, and other threat actors have engaged and are expected to continue to engage in cyber-attacks. Additionally, some actors are using AI technology to launch more automated, targeted and coordinated attacks. Due to geopolitical conflicts[removed] and during times of war or other major conflicts, we and the third parties we rely upon may be subject to a heightened risk of cyber-attacks that could materially disrupt our ability to provide services and products. We may also face cybersecurity threats due to error or intentional misconduct by employees, contractors or other third-party service providers. Certain aspects of effective cybersecurity are dependent upon our employees, contractors and/or other third-party service providers safeguarding our sensitive information and adhering to our security policies and access control mechanisms. We have in the past experienced, and may in the future experience, security incidents arising from a failure to properly handle sensitive information or adhere to our security policies and access control mechanisms, including, for example, employees posting company data on third-party websites without permission, and, although no such events have had a material adverse effect on our business, there can be no assurance that an insider threat or error will not result in an incident that is material to us or lead to negative publicity. Furthermore, we rely on products and services provided by third-party suppliers to operate certain critical business systems, including without limitation, cloud-based infrastructure, encryption and authentication technology, employee email and other functions, which exposes us to supply-chain attacks or other business disruptions. We cannot guarantee that third parties and infrastructure in our supply chain or our partners' supply chains have not been compromised or that they do not contain exploitable vulnerabilities, defects or bugs that could result in a breach of or disruption to our information technology systems, including our products and services, or the third-party information technology systems that support our services. We have incorporated third-party data into some of our AI models and used open-source datasets to train our models and may continue to do so. These datasets may be flawed, insufficient, or contain certain biased information, and may otherwise decrease resilience to security incidents that may compromise the integrity of our AI outputs, leading to potential reputational damage, regulatory scrutiny, or adverse impacts on the performance and reliability of our products, which could, in turn, affect our partners' operations, customer trust, and our revenue. We may have limited insight into the data privacy or security practices of third-party suppliers, including for our AI algorithms. Our ability to monitor these third parties' information security practices is limited, and they may not have adequate information security measures in place. In addition, if one of our third-party suppliers suffers a security incident (which has happened in the past and may happen in the future), our response may be limited or more difficult because we may not have direct access to their systems, logs and other information related to the security incident.

Factors that have caused and/or could in the future cause disruptions to our worldwide operations include: natural disasters, extreme weather conditions, power or water shortages, critical infrastructure failures, telecommunications failures, supplier disruptions, terrorist attacks, acts of violence, political and/or civil unrest, acts of war or other military[removed] actions, epidemics or pandemics, abrupt regulatory changes, and other natural or man-made disasters and catastrophic events. Our corporate headquarters, a large portion of our current data center capacity, and a portion of our research and development activities are located in California, and other critical business operations, finished goods inventory and some of our suppliers are located in Asia, making our operations vulnerable to natural disasters such as earthquakes, wildfires or other business disruptions occurring in these geographical areas. Catastrophic events can also have an impact on third-party vendors who provide us critical infrastructure services for IT and research and development systems and personnel. Geopolitical and domestic political developments and other events beyond our control can increase economic volatility globally. Political instability, changes in government or adverse political developments in or around any of the major countries in which we do business may harm our business, financial [removed] condition and results of operations. Worldwide geopolitical tensions and conflicts, including but not limited to China, Hong Kong, Israel, Korea and Taiwan where the manufacture of our product components and final assembly of our products are concentrated may result in changing regulatory requirements, and other disruptions that could impact our operations and operating strategies, product demand, access to global markets, hiring, and profitability. For example, other countries have restricted and may continue in the future to restrict business with the State of Israel, where we have engineering, sales support operations and manufacturing, and companies with Israeli operations, including by economic boycotts. Our operations could be harmed and our costs could increase if manufacturing, logistics, or other operations are disrupted for any reason, including natural disasters, high heat events, water shortages, power shortages, information technology system failures or cyber-attacks, military actions or economic, and business, labor, environmental, public health, or political issues. The ultimate impact on us, our third-party foundries and other suppliers of being located and consolidated in certain geographical areas is unknown. In the event a disaster, war, or catastrophic event affects us, the third-party systems on which we rely, or our customers, our business could be harmed as a result of declines in revenue, increases in expenses, and substantial expenditures and time spent to fully resume operations. Our business continuity and disaster recovery planning may not be sufficient for all eventualities. All of these risks and conditions could materially adversely affect our future sales and operating results.

Given the increasing strategic importance of AI and rising geopolitical tensions, the USG has changed and may again change the export control rules at any time and further subject a wider range of our products to export restrictions and licensing requirements, negatively impacting our business and financial results. In the event of such change, we may be unable to sell our inventory of such products and may be unable to develop replacement products not subject to the licensing requirements, effectively excluding us from all or part of the China market, as well as other impacted markets, including the Middle East and countries designated "Tier 2" by the AI Diffusion IFR. For example, the USG has already imposed conditions to limit the ability of foreign firms to create and offer as a service large-scale GPU clusters, for example by imposing license conditions on the use of products to be exported to certain countries, and may impose additional conditions such as requiring chip tracking and throttling mechanisms that could disable or impair GPUs if certain events, including unauthorized system configuration, use, or location, are detected. The USG has already imposed export controls restricting certain gaming GPUs, and if the USG expands such controls to restrict additional gaming products, it may disrupt a significant portion of our supply and distribution chain and negatively impact sales of such products to markets outside China, including the U.S. and Europe. In addition, as the performance of the gaming GPUs increases over time, export controls may have a greater impact on our ability to compete in markets subject to those controls. Export controls [removed] may disrupt our supply and distribution chain for a substantial portion of our products, which are warehoused in and distributed from Hong Kong. Export controls restricting our ability to sell data center GPUs may also negatively impact demand for our networking products used in servers containing our GPUs. The USG may also impose export controls on our networking products, such as high-speed network interconnects, to limit the ability of downstream parties to create large clusters for frontier model training.[removed] Any new control that impacts a wider range of our products would likely have a disproportionate impact on NVIDIA and may disadvantage us against certain of our competitors that sell chips that are outside the scope of such control. [removed] Excessive or shifting export controls have already and may in the future encourage customers outside China and other impacted regions to "design-out" certain U.S. semiconductors from their products to reduce the compliance burden and risk, and to ensure that they are able to serve markets worldwide. [removed] Excessive or shifting export controls have already encouraged and may in the future encourage overseas governments to request that our customers purchase from our competitors rather than NVIDIA or other U.S. firms, harming our business, market position, and financial results.[removed] As a result, excessive or shifting export controls may negatively impact demand for our products and services not only in China, but also in other markets, such as Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Excessive or shifting export controls increase the risk of investing in U.S. advanced semiconductor products, because by the time a new product is ready for market, it may be subject to new unilateral export controls restricting its sale. At the same time, such controls may increase investment in foreign competitors, which would be less likely to be restricted by U.S. controls. If additional products are subject to worldwide licensing requirements, we may incur significant inventory provisions and excess purchase obligation charges.

In the ordinary course of business, we transfer personal data from Europe, China, and other jurisdictions to the United States or other countries. Certain jurisdictions have enacted data localization laws and cross-border personal data[removed] transfer laws. For example, the GDPR governs the transfer of personal data to countries outside of the EEA. The European Commission released a set of "Standard Contractual Clauses" designed for entities to validly transfer personal data out of the EEA to jurisdictions that the European Commission has not found to provide an adequate level of protection, including the United States. Additionally, the U.K.'s International Data Transfer Agreement / Addendum, as well as the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework and the U.K. extension thereto (which allows for transfers to relevant U.S.-based organizations who self-certify compliance and participate in the Framework) are mechanisms that may be used to transfer personal data from the EEA and U.K. to the United States. However, these mechanisms are subject to legal challenges, and there is no assurance that we can satisfy or rely on these measures to lawfully transfer personal data to the United States. Other jurisdictions have enacted or are considering similar cross-border personal data transfer laws and local personal data residency laws, any of which would increase the cost and complexity of doing business and could result in fines from regulators. For example, China's law imposes various requirements relating to data processing and data localization. Data broadly defined as important under China's law, including personal data, may not be transferable outside of China without prior assessment and approval by the Cyberspace Administration of China, or CAC.[removed] Compliance with these requirements, including CAC assessments and any deemed failures of such assessments, could cause us to incur liability, prevent us from using data collected in China or impact our ability to transfer data outside of China. The inability to import personal data to the United States could significantly and negatively impact our business operations, limit our ability to collaborate with parties that are subject to European, China and other data privacy and security laws, or require us to increase our personal data processing capabilities in Europe and/or elsewhere at significant expense. Some European regulators have prevented companies from transferring personal data out of Europe for allegedly violating the GDPR's cross-border data transfer limitations, which could negatively impact our business.

Gross margins [removed] increased to 75.0% in fiscal year [removed] 2025 from 72.7% in fiscal year [removed] 2024. The year over year increase was primarily driven by a higher mix of Data Center revenue.

Provisions for inventory and excess inventory purchase obligations totaled [removed] $3.7 billion and [removed] $2.2 billion for fiscal years [removed] 2025 and 2024, respectively. Sales of previously reserved inventory and settlements of excess inventory purchase obligations resulted in a provision release of [removed] $689 million and $540 million for fiscal years [removed] 2025 and 2024, respectively. The net effect on our gross margin was an unfavorable impact of [removed] 2.3% and 2.7% in fiscal years [removed] 2025 and 2024, respectively.